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Abstract—The growing security threat of microarchitectural
attacks underlines the importance of robust security sensors and
detection mechanisms at the hardware level. While there are
studies on runtime detection of cache attacks, a generic model to
consider the broad range of existing and future attacks is missing.
Unfortunately, previous approaches only consider either a single
attack variant, e.g. Prime+Probe, or specific victim applications
such as cryptographic implementations. Furthermore, the state-
of-the art anomaly detection methods are based on coarse-grained
statistical models, which are not successful to detect anomalies
in a large-scale real world systems.
Thanks to the memory capability of advanced Recurrent
Neural Networks (RNNs) algorithms, both short and long term
dependencies can be learned more accurately. Therefore, we
propose FortuneTeller, which for the first time leverages the
superiority of RNNs to learn complex execution patterns and
detects unseen microarchitectural attacks in real world systems.
FortuneTeller models benign workload pattern from a microar-
chitectural standpoint in an unsupervised fashion, and then,
it predicts how upcoming benign executions are supposed to
behave. Potential attacks and malicious behaviors will be detected
automatically, when there is a discrepancy between the predicted
execution pattern and the runtime observation.
We implement FortuneTeller based on the available hardware
performance counters on Intel processors and it is trained with 10
million samples obtained from benign applications. For the first
time, the latest attacks such as Meltdown, Spectre, Rowhammer
and Zombieload are detected with one trained model and without
observing these attacks during the training. We show that
FortuneTeller achieves the best false positive and false negative
trade off compared to existing works under realistic workloads
and target implementations with the highest F-score of 0.9970.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, we have witnessed the evolution of
microarchitectural side-channel attacks [15], [18], [29], [30],
[64], from being considered as a nuisance and largely dis-
missed by chip manufacturers to becoming frontpage news.
The severity of the threat was demonstrated by the Spectre [31]
and Meltdown [33] attacks, which allow a user with minimum
access right to easily read arbitrary locations in the memory by
exploiting the transient effect of illegal instruction sequences.
This was followed by a plethora of attacks [35], [39], [47],
[56] either extending the scope of the microarchitectural flaws
or identifying new leakage sources. It is noteworthy that these
critical vulnerabilities managed to stay hidden for decades.
Only after years of experimentation, researchers managed to
gain sufficient insight into, for the most part, the unpublished
aspects of these platforms. This leads to the point that they
could formulate fairly simple but very subtle attacks to recover
internal secrets. Therefore, the natural question becomes: how
can we discover dormant vulnerabilities and protect against
such subtle attacks? A fundamental approach is to eliminate
the leakage altogether by using formal analysis. However,
given the tremendous level of complexity of modern com-
puting platforms and lack of public documentation, formal
analysis of the hardware seems impractical in the near future.
What remains is the modus operandi: leaks are patched as
they are discovered by researchers through inspection and
statistical analysis.
Countermeasures for microarchitectural side-channel attacks
focus on the operating system (OS) hardening [17], [34],
software synthesis [8], [44] and analysis [4], [60], [61], and
static [28] or dynamic [7], [10], [67] detection of attacks. Static
analysis is performed by evaluating the untrusted software
against known malicious code patterns without running it on
a target platform [28]. Alternatively, dynamic analysis aims to
detect malicious behaviors in the system by analyzing the run-
time footprint of the running processes [10]. Existing works on
dynamic detection of microarchitectural attacks are based on
collecting footprints from the hardware performance counters
(HPCs) and limited modeling of malicious behaviors [7], [10],
[41], [67]. A crucial challenge for both detection techniques
is the shortage of knowledge about new attack vectors. There-
fore, modeling malicious behaviors for undiscovered attacks
and accurately distinguishing them from benign activities are
open problems. Moreover, microarchitectural attacks are in
infancy, and supervised learning models, which are used as
attack classifier [41], are not reliable to detect known attacks
due to the insufficient amount and imprecise labeling of the
data. Hence, unsupervised methods are more promising to
adapt the detection models to real world scenarios.
Anomaly-based attack detection, which has been also stud-
ied in other security applications [16], [49], aims to address
the aforementioned challenge by only modeling the benign
behaviors and detecting outliers. While there have been several
efforts on anomaly-based detection of cache attacks [7], [10],
modern microarchitectures have a diverse set of components
that suffers from side-channel attacks [15], [18], [40], [65].
Thus, detection techniques will not be practical and usable, if
they do not cover a broad range of both known and unseen
attacks. This requires more advanced learning algorithms to
comprehensively model the entire behavior of the microarchi-
tecture. On the other hand, statistical methods for anomaly
detection are not sufficient to analyze millions of events that
are collected from a very complex system like the modern
microarchiecture. A major limitation of the classical statistical
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learning methods is that they use a hand-picked set of features,
which wastes the valuable information to characterize the
benign execution patterns. As a result, these techniques fail
at building a generic model for real-world systems.
The latest advancements in Deep Learning, especially in Re-
current Neural Networks (RNNs), shows that time dependent
tasks such as language modeling [53], speech recognition [46]
can be learned and upcoming sequences are predicted more
efficiently by training millions of data samples. Similarly,
computer programs are translated to processor instructions,
and the corresponding microarchitectural events have time
dependent behaviors. Modeling the sequential flow of these
events for benign applications is extremely difficult by using
logic and formal reasoning due to the complexity of the
modern microarchitecture. We claim that these time dependent
behaviors can be modeled in a large scale by observing
sufficient number of benign execution flows. Since the long-
term dependencies in the time domain can be learned with a
high accuracy by training Long-short term memory (LSTM)
and Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) networks, the fingerprint
of benign applications in a processor can also be learned
efficiently. In addition, a challenging task of choosing the
features of benign applications can be done automatically by
LSTM/GRU networks in the training phase without any expert
input.
Our Contribution: We propose FortuneTeller which is the
first generic detection model/technique for microarchitectural
attacks. FortuneTeller learns the benign behavior of hardware/-
software systems by observing microarchitectural events, and
classifies any outlier that does not conform to the trained
model as malicious behavior. FortuneTeller can detect unseen
microarchitectural attacks, since it only requires training over
benign execution patterns.
In summary, we propose FortuneTeller which:
• is a generic detection technique, that can be applied to
detect attacks on other microarchitectures and execution
environments.
• for the first time, can detect various attacks automatically,
disregarding the victim application, including cryptogr-
pahic implementations, browser passwords, secret data in
kernel environment, bit flips and so on.
• can detect attacks that were not observed during the
training, or future attacks that may be introduced by the
security community.
More specifically, we show:
1) different types of hardware performance counters can be
used as the most optimum security sensor available on
the commodity processors.
2) how to capture the system-wide low-level microarchi-
tectural traces and learn noisy time-dependent sequences
through advanced RNN algorithms by training a more
advanced and generic model.
3) FortuneTeller performs better by comparing it to the
state-of-the art detection techniques.
4) we can detect malicious behavior dynamically in an
unsupervised manner including stealthy cache attacks
(Flush+Flush), transient execution attacks (Meltdown,
Spectre, Zombieload) and Rowhammer.
A. Outline:
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
provides background information on microarchitecural attacks,
performance counters and RNNs. Then, Section III gives an
overview of previous works. Section IV outlines the method-
ology and implementation of FortuneTeller. Also, information
on our benign and attack dataset and performance counter
selection are given. Section V evaluates the results. The
comparison with the prior works is given in Section VI.
Finally, Section VII discusses the results and Section VIII
concludes our work.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Microarchitectural Attacks
Modern computer architecture has a tremendously complex
and optimized design. In order to improve the performance,
several low-level features have been introduced such as spec-
ulative branches, out-of-order executions and shared last level
cache (LLC). All these components are potential targets for
microarchitectural attacks. Therefore, the following paragraphs
give insight into microarchitectural attacks, which are exam-
ples of attacks that can be detected by FortuneTeller.
Flush+Reload (F+R) The LLC is shared among all cores in
the processor. Flush+Reload attack [64] aims to track accesses
to specific cache lines by using the clflush instruction. First,
adversary flushes the victim cache line. Then, the victim
executes some instructions. Finally, the adversary reloads the
same cache line and measures the access time. Flush+Reload
attack is mostly used to recover cryptographic keys [63],
which is applicable to perform attacks on systems with enabled
memory deduplication such as cloud environments [21], [27].
Flush+Flush (F+F) Flush+Flush attack uses the clflush in-
struction to flush the specific cache lines [20]. Instead of mea-
suring the time to access a cache line, the execution time of the
clflush instruction is measured. This method is considered as
a stealthy attack against detection methods, since the number
of introduced cache misses is low by this attack. Flush+Flush
attack is used to exploit the T-table implementation of AES
and user’s keystrokes [20].
Prime+Probe (P+P) In a Prime+Probe attack, an adversary
aims to fill an entire cache set, and then, measures the
access time to the same cache set [55]. If a victim evicts
any of the adversary’s cache line from the set, the adversary
will observe access latency which leaks information about
the victim’s memory access pattern. While it has a lower
resolution compared to Flush+Reload and Flush+Flush, it has
a broader applicability. Prime+Probe attack was applied in
the cloud environment to steal secret keys [24], [26], [68],
Javascript to detect the visited webpages [42] and mobile
phones to detect applications and user input [22], [32].
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B. Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs)
Rowhammer DRAM cells have the possibility to leak charge
over time. Rowhammer [19] triggers the leak by accessing
neighboring rows repeatedly. This leads to bit flips, which
enables adversaries with low access right to gain system
privileges [48]. clflush instruction is also commonly used
to increase repeated access to the DRAM by bypassing the
cache [5].
Spectre Spectre attacks exploit speculative branches [31]. This
attack is able to read memory addresses, which do not belong
to the adversary by misusing the branch prediction. Therefore,
sensitive data such as credentials stored in the browser can
be leaked from the victim’s memory space. Spectre is also
effective against the SGX environment to compromise the
trusted execution [9], [56].
Meltdown Meltdown attack focuses on out-of-order execution
to read kernel memory addresses [33]. The victim’s secret,
which is loaded into the registers will be mapped to different
cache lines. Flush+Reload is used to determine if a specific
cache line has been accessed. An adversary with only user
privileges can perform this attack to read the content of kernel
address space. The same concept has also been applied to Intel
SGX [56] to bypass the hardware supported memory isolation.
ZombieLoad Meltdown-style attacks can also specifically leak
data from various microarchitectural resources such as store
buffer [39], line fill buffer (LFB) [47] and load ports [57].
ZombileLoad attack leaks data from memory load operations
that are executed in other user processes and kernel context.
Faulting/assisting loads that are executed by a malicious
process can retrieve the stale data belonging to other security
domains. This data that has been falsely forwarded from the
shared resources may include secrets such as cryptographic
keys or website URLs which can be transmitted over a covert
channel such as the Flush+Reload technique.
Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs) store low-level
hardware-related events in the CPU. These events are tracked
as counters that are available through special purpose registers.
There are various performance events available in processors.
The counters are used to collect information about the system
behavior while an application is running. They have been used
by researchers to reverse-engineer the internal design choices
in the processor [37], or to increase the performance of the
software by analyzing the bottlenecks [3]. These low-level
counters are provided on all major architectures developed by
ARM, Intel, AMD, and NVIDIA.
There are various tools to program and read performance
counters. Intel PCM [25] supports both core and offcore
counters on Intel processors. The core counters give access
to events within a single core of a processor, while the
offcore counters profile events and activities across the cores
and within the processor’s die. This includes some of the
events related to the integrated memory controller and the Intel
QuickPath Interconnect which is shared by all cores. Before
using the performance counters, we need to program each
of them to monitor a specific event. Afterwards, the counter
state can be sampled. In this work, we only focused on core
counters, since the offcore counters have a small variety.
C. Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs)
RNNs are a type of Artificial Netural Network algorithm,
which is used to learn and predict the sequential data. RNNs
are mostly applied to speech recognition and currently used by
Apple’s Siri [52] and Google’s Voice Search [11]. The reason
behind the integration of RNNs into real world applications is
that it is the first algorithm to remember the temporal relations
in the input through its internal memory. Therefore, RNNs are
mostly preferred for tasks where sequential data is involved.
In a typical RNN structure, the information cycles through
a loop. When the algorithm needs to make a decision, it uses
the current input xt and hidden state ht−1 where the learned
features from the previous data samples are kept as shown
in Figure 1a. Basically, a RNN algorithm produces output
based on the previous data samples, and provides the output
as a feedback into the network. However, traditional RNN
algorithms are not good at learning the long-term sequences
because the amount of extracted information converges to zero
with the increasing time steps. In other words, the gradient is
vanished and the model stops learning after long sequences.
In order to overcome this problem, two algorithms were
introduced, as described below:
1) Long-Short Term Memory: Long-Short Term Memory
(LSTM) networks are modified RNNs, which essentially ex-
tends the internal memory to learn longer time sequences.
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LSTM networks consist of memory cell, input, forget and
output gates as shown in Figure 1b. The memory cell keeps
the learned information from the previous sequences. While
the cell state is modified by the forget gate, the output of the
forget gate multiplies the specific positions in the input matrix
by 0 to forget and by 1 to keep the information. The forget gate
equation is as follow; ft = σ(Wf [ht−1, xt] + bt), where sig-
moid function is applied to the weighted input and the previous
hidden state. In the input gate, the useful input sections are
determined to be fed into the cell state. The input gate equation
is it = σ(Wi[ht−1, xt] + bi), where sigmoid function is used
as an activation function. This gate is combined with the input
modulation gate to switch the cell state to forget memory. The
activation function for input modulation gate is tanh. Finally,
the output gate passes the output to the next hidden state by
applying the equation ot = σ(Wo[ht−1, xt] + bo), where tanh
is used as an activation function. Therefore, LSTM networks
can select distinct features in the time sequence data more
efficiently than RNNs, which enables learning the long-term
temporal relations in the input.
2) Gated Recurrent Unit: Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU)
is improved version of RNNs. GRU uses two gates called,
update gate and reset gate. The update gate uses the following
equation: zt = σ(Wzxt + Uzht− 1). Basically, both current
input and the previous hidden state are multiplied with their
own weights and added together. Then, a sigmoid activation
function is applied to map the data between 0 and 1. The
importance of the update gate is to determine the amount of
the past information to be passed along to the future. Then, the
reset gate is used to decide how much of the past information
to forget. In order to calculate how much to forget, rt =
σ(Wrxt+Urht−1) equation is used, where the previous hidden
state and current input are multiplied with their corresponding
weights. Then, the results are summed and sigmoid function is
applied. The output is passed to the current memory cell which
stores the relevant information from the past. It is calculated
as ht′ = tanh(Wxt+rtUht−1). The element-wise product
between reset gate and weighted previous hidden layer state
determines the information to be removed from previous time
steps. Finally, the current information is calculated by the
equation ht = zt  ht−1 + (1− zt) ht. The purpose of this
part is to use the information obtained from update gate and
combine both reset and update gate information. Hence, while
the relevant samples are learned by update gate, the redundant
information such as noise is eliminated by reset gate.
In this work, the RNN algorithms are used in an unsuper-
vised fashion where there is no need for separate validation
dataset in the training phase. The validation error is calcu-
lated for each prediction in the next timestamp and the total
validation error is given after each epoch.
III. RELATED WORK
A. Detecting Attacks using HPCs
Low-level performance monitoring events such as HPCs
have been used as security sensors to detect malicious ac-
tivities [23], [36]. Similar to [62], [66], Numchecker [58]
and Confirm [59] adopt these sensors to detect control flow
violations, which are applied to rootkits and firmware modifi-
cations, respectively. In addition, classical ML algorithms such
as support vector machines (SVMs) and k-nearest neighbors
(KNNs) are adapted to naive heuristic-based techniques for
multi-class classification [6], [13]. The latter explores neural
network in a supervised fashion [13]. Tang et al. [54] train
One-Class Support Vector Machine (OC-SVM) with benign
system behavior and detect the malware in the system.
Despite the detection of malware and rootkits in the system,
HPCs have also been used to detect microarchitectural attacks.
Since our work focuses on microarchitectural attack detection,
the features of prior approaches and our detection technique
are compared in Table I. Firstly, Chiappetta et al. [10] proposes
to monitor HPCs and the data is analyzed by using Gaussian
Sampling (GS) or probability density function (pdf) to detect
the anomalies on cryptographic implementations dynamically.
Later, Zhang et al. [67] apply Dynamic Time Wrapping
(DTW) to catch cryptographic implementation executions in
the victim VMs. Then, the number of cache misses and
hits in the attacker VMs are monitored during the execution
of the sensitive operations. Briongos et al. [7] implement
Change Point Detection (CPD) technique to determine the
sudden changes in the time series data to detect F+F, F+R
and P+P attacks. Finally, Mushtaq et al. [41] detect the
cache oriented microarchitectural attacks with supervised Lin-
ear Discriminant Analysis (LDA), Support Vector Machine
(SVM) and Linear Regression (LR) technique under various
system loads. We further compare the most related works with
FortuneTeller in Section VI.
B. RNN Applications in Security
RNN algorithms are applied to other security domains to
increase the efficiency of defensive technologies. For instance,
Shin et al. [51] leverage RNNs to identify functions in the
program binary. Once the model is trained with these function,
the technique classifies the bytes to decide on whether it is
the beginning of the function or not. Similarly, Pascanu et
al. [43] apply RNNs to detect malware by training the APIs
in an unsupervised way. The technique improves the true
positive rate by 98% compared to previous studies. In another
study, Melicher et al. [38] introduce RNN-based technique to
improve guessing attacks on password’s resistance. This study
shows better accuracy than Markov models. Furthermore, Du
et al. [14] implement LSTM based anomaly detection to detect
anomalies in the system. The LSTM model is trained with log
data obtained from normal execution. Their results show that
the traditional data mining techniques underperform LSTM
model to detect the anomalies. Finally, Shen et al. [50] apply
LSTM and GRU networks to predict the next security events
with a precision of up to 0.93. These studies indicate that
RNN based security applications are commonly used in other
challenging environments.
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TABLE I
COMPARISON WITH PRIOR WORKS: FortuneTeller IS ABLE TO DETECT ATTACKS THAT WERE UNSEEN DURING THE TRAINING SUCH AS FLUSH+FLUSH
(F+F), PRIME+PROBE (P+P), FLUSH+RELOAD (F+R), SPECTRE, MELTDOWN AND ROWHAMMER. IN CONTRAST TO PRIOR WORKS, FortuneTeller IS
FULLY UNSUPERVISED AND IS AGNOSTIC TO THE TARGET APPLICATION.
Prior Works Learning Algorithm Approach Detected Attacks Target Implementations
Mushtaq et al. [41] LDA/LR/SVM Supervised F+F, F+R Crypto
Zhang et al. [67] DTW Semi-Supervised P+P, F+R Crypto/Hash
Chiappetta et al. [10] GS Unsupervised P+P, F+R Crypto
Briongos et al. [7] CPD Unsupervised F+F, F+R, P+P Crypto
F+F, F+R, P+P
Rowhammer Benchmarks
Our Work LSTM/GRU Unsupervised Spectre
Meltdown
Zombieload
Real-world Apps
Train RNN Model
Cell 1 Cell 2 Cell 3 Cell n
Window
Benign
Workload
Select
Sensors
Collect
Traces
Trained
Model
Runtime
Workload
Collect
Traces
Outliers
Offline
Phase
Online
Phase
Fig. 2. FortuneTellerimplementation
IV. FortuneTeller
A. Methodology
Our conceptual design for FortuneTeller consists of two
phases as shown in Figure 2: In the offline phase, For-
tuneTeller collects time sequence data from diverse set of
benign applications by monitoring security sensors in the
system. The collected data is used as the training data and
it is fed into the RNN algorithm with a sliding window
technique. The weights of the trained model are optimized
by the algorithm itself since each data sample is also used
as the validation. When there is no further improvement in
the validation error, the training process stops. Once the RNN
model is trained, it is ready to be used in a real time system.
In the online phase, the real-time sequences are captured
from the same security sensors and given as input to RNN
models. The prediction of the next measurement for each
sensor is made by the pre-trained RNN models, dynamically.
If the mean squared error (MSE) between the predicted value
and the real time sensor measurement is consistently higher
than a threshold, the anomaly flag is set. The online phase is
the actual evaluation of FortuneTeller in a real world system.
Two separate detection models are trained with LSTM and
GRU networks since they are known for their extraordinary
capabilities in learning the long time sequences. Our purpose
is to train an RNN-based detection model, which can predict
the microarchitectural events in the next time steps with the
minimal error. In our detection scenario, we consider a time
series X = {x(1), x(2), . . . , x(n)}, where each measurement
x(t) ∈ Rm is an m-dimensional vector {x(t)1 , x(t)2 , . . . , x(t)m }
and each element corresponds to a sensor value at time t.
As all temporal relations can not be discovered from millions
of samples, a sliding window with a size of W is used to
partition the data into small chunks. Thereby, the input to RNN
algorithm at time step t is {x(t−W+1)1 , x(t−W+2)2 , . . . , x(t)m },
where the output is y(t) = x(t+1). Note that, even though there
is a fixed length sliding window in the problem formulation,
the overall input size is not fixed. Finally, the trained model
is saved to be used in real-world system.
To evaluate the trained model, test dataset is collected from
benign applications and attack executions. The test dataset
has the same structure with the training data, and is fed into
the model to calculate the prediction error in the next time
steps. The error at time step t + 1 is e(t+1) which is equal
5
to 1/m
∑m
i=1(y
t+1
i −xt+1i )2. The model predicts the value of
next measurement and then, the error for is summed up to one
value.
To detect the anomalies in the system, a decision window
D and an anomaly threshold τA are used. If all the predictions
in D are higher than τA, then the anomaly flag FA is set in
the system in Equation 1.
FA =
{
1, ∀e(t+1) ∈ D ≥ τA
0, otherwise
(1)
The choice of D directly determines the anomaly detection
time. If D is chosen as a small value, the attacks are discovered
with a very small leakage. On the other hand, the false alarm
risk increases in parallel, which is controlled by adjusting τA.
This trade-off is discussed further in Section V.
B. Implementation
1) Profiled Benchmarks and Attacks: The main purpose
of FortuneTeller is to train a generic model by profiling a
diverse set of benign applications. Therefore, selecting benign
applications is utmost importance. For the benign application
dataset, benchmark tests in Phoronix benchmark suite [1] are
profiled since the suite includes different type of applications
such as cryptographic implementations, floating point and
compression tests, web-server workloads etc. The complete
list is given in Appendix, Table V. It is important to note
that some benchmark tests have multiple sub-tests and all
the sub-tests are included in both training and test phases.
In addition to CPU benchmarks, we evaluate our detection
models against system, disk and memory test benchmarks. In
order to increase the diversity, the daily applications such web
browsing, video rendering, Apache server, MySQL database
and Office applications with several parameters are profiled
for real-world examples.
A subset of benign execution data is used to train our
RNN models and then, the whole benign dataset is used
to calculate the FPR (False Positive Rate) and TNR (True
Negative Rate) of the models. In our work, FPs represents the
benign applications which are classified as an attack/anomaly
by the RNN model. If the benign application does not raise
the alarm flag, it is considered as TNs.
For the attack executions we include traditional cache attack
techniques such as F+F, F+R and P+P attacks. Different from
previous works, these attacks are applied on arbitrary memory
blocks to avoid any assumption on the target implementation.
Spectre (v1 and v2) and Meltdown are implemented to read
secrets such as passwords in a pre-determined memory loca-
tion. In addition, two types of Rowhammer attacks namely,
one-sided and double-sided, are applied to have bit flips. In
order to test the efficiency of FortuneTeller we implemented
a recent microarchitectural attack, Zombieload, to steal data
across processes. For this purpose, a victim thread leaks pre-
determined ASCII characters and the attacker reads the line-fill
buffer to recover the secret. If the alarm flag is set during the
execution of the attack, it is True Positive (TP). On the other
hand, the undetected attack execution is represented by False
Negative (FN).
2) Performance Counter Selection: In our detection model,
we leverage HPCs as security sensors. Although the number
of available counters in a processor is more than 100, it is
not feasible to monitor all counters concurrently. In an ideal
system, we should be able to collect data from a diverse set of
events to be able to train a generic model. However, due to the
limited number of concurrently monitored events, we choose
the most optimum subset of counters that give us information
about common attacks. For this purpose, we perform a study
of the best subset of performance counters.
In our experiments, we leverage Intel PCM tool [25] to
capture the system-wide traces. The set of counters in our
experiments is chosen from core counters. The main reason
to choose core counters is the high variety of the available
counters such as branches, cache, TLB, etc. The number
of core counters tested in the selection method is 36. The
complete list is given in Appendix, Table IV.
In the data collection step, a subset of the counters is pro-
filed concurrently, since the number of counters monitored in
parallel is limited to four in Intel processors. For each subset,
a separate dataset collected until all 36 counters are covered.
The training data is collected from 30 different Phoronix
benchmark tests [1] (1-30 in the Table V). In order to decide
on the most suitable counters to detect microarchitectural
anomalies, we collect a test dataset from 20 benchmark tests
(1-56 in the Table V) and 6 microarchitectural attacks (174-
179 in the Table V). The Zombieload attack is not included
in the performance counter selection phase, since it was not
released at that time. The sampling rate is chosen as 1 ms to
have the minimal overhead in the system.
For every subset of counters one LSTM model is trained
with a window size of W = 100. The four dimensional data is
given as an input to LSTM model and then, the final counters
are selected based on their F-score given in Appendix, Ta-
ble IV. It is observed that some counters have better accuracy
than other counters for specific attacks. For instance, branch
related counters have high correlation for Meltdown and Spec-
tre attacks. However, the F-score is also around 0.3 because
real-world applications also use the branches heavily. One of
the important outcome of selection phase is that speculative
branches are commonly integrated in the benign applications.
Therefore, the counter selection shows that branch counters
are not useful to detect speculative execution attacks. Thanks
to our LSTM based counter selection technique, finding the
most valuable counters is fully automated and the success rate
of detecting anomalies with low FPR and FNR is increased
significantly.
Even though it is allowed to choose up to 4 counters on
the Intel server systems like Xeon, we selected 3 counters
to profile for anomaly detection. The reason behind this
is that in the desktop processors (Intel Core i5, i7) the
programmable counters are limited to 3. The first selected
counter is L1 Inst Miss, which is more successful to de-
tect Rowhammer, Spectre and Meltdown attacks with 14%
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FPR, where the F-score is 0.7979. As a second counter,
L1 Inst Hit is chosen, since Flush+Flush and Flush+Reload
attacks are detected with a high accuracy and the F-score
is 0.8137. The reason behind the high F-score is that the
flush instruction is heavily used in those attacks and the
instruction cache usage also increases in parallel. Interestingly,
Flush+Flush attack is known as a stealthy microarchitectural
attack however, it is possible to detect it by monitoring
instruction cache hit counter. The last selected counter is
LLC Miss, which is successful to detect Rowhammer and
Prime+Probe attacks with a high accuracy. These attacks cause
frequent cache evictions in the LLC, which increases the
number of anomalies in the LLC Miss counter. These results
show that the individual counters are not efficient to detect all
the microarchitectural attacks. Therefore, there is a need for
the integration of the aforementioned 3 counters to detect all
the attacks with a high confidence rate.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we explain the experiments which are
conducted to evaluate FortuneTeller. The experiments aim
to answer the following research questions: 1) How does
FortuneTeller perform in predicting the next performance
counter values for benign applications with the increasing
number of measurements(Section V-B)? What is the lowest
possible FPR for server (Section V-C) and laptop environments
(Section V-D)? 3) How does the size of sliding window
affect the performance of FortuneTeller (Section V-E)? 4)
How realistic is real time protection with FortuneTeller (Sec-
tion V-F)? 5) How much performance overhead is caused by
FortuneTeller (Section V-G)?
A. Experiment Setup
FortuneTeller is tested on two separate systems. The first
system runs on an Intel Xeon E5-2640v3, which is a common
processor used on server machines. It has 8 cores with 2.6
GHz base frequency and 20 MB LLC. The second device is
used to illustrate a typical laptop/desktop machine, which is
based on Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-8650U CPU with 1.90 GHz
frequency. It has 8MB LLC and 2 cores in total.
Two types of RNN model namely, LSTM and GRU, are
used to train FortuneTeller. The sliding window size, batch
size and number of hidden LSTM/GRU layers are kept same
in the training phase. Training of RNN models is done using
the custom Keras [12] scripts together with the Tensorflow [2]
and GPU backend. The models are trained on a workstation
with two Nvidia 1080Ti (Pascal) GPUs, a 20-core Intel i7-
7900X CPU, and 64 GB of RAM.
B. RNN Model Training
To detect the anomalies in the system, the first step is to
learn the pattern of the benign applications. This is not an easy
task, since the chosen benchmarks and real-world applications
have complicated fingerprint in the microarchitectural level
with the system noise. Moreover, the fingerprint at each
execution is not identical and the execution of the application
takes several seconds, which makes it difficult to learn long-
term relations in the data. Therefore, the required number of
measurements from each individual application plays a crucial
role to train the FortuneTeller successfully. For this purpose,
we choose 10 random benchmarks and a separate model for
each of them is trained. The validation error obtained as
a result of training is the critical metric to determine the
capacity of the RNN algorithms as it indicates how well
FortuneTeller guesses the next counter value. The first RNN
model is trained with only 1 measurement and the number of
measurements is increased gradually up to 44. It is observed
that there is no further improvement in the validation error
after 36 measurements for both LSTM and GRU networks
in Figure 4. Note that, the training data is scaled to [0 1] and
the validation error is the average error of the 3 counters.
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Fig. 5. Prediction error in Gnupg for LSTM algorithm
In Figure 5, the prediction of ICache.Hit counter value
by using LSTM network is shown. The solid line represents
the actual counter value while two other lines show the
prediction values. When there is only one measurement to
train the LSTM network, the prediction error is much higher.
It means the trained model could not optimize the weights
with small amount of data. On the other hand, once the
number of measurements is increased to 36, the predictions
are more consistent and close to actual counter value. The
number of measurements directly affects the training time of
the model. If the dataset is unnecessarily huge, the training
time increases in linear. Therefore, it is decided to collect 36
measurements from each application in the training phase to
achieve the best outcome from RNN algorithms in the real
systems. With the accurate modeling of the benign behavior,
the number of false alarms is reduced significantly. This is the
main advantage of FortuneTeller, since the previous detection
mechanisms apply a simple threshold technique to detect the
anomalies when a counter value exceeds the threshold. In
contrast, FortuneTeller can predict the sudden increases in the
counter values and the correct classification can be made more
efficiently than before.
C. Server Environment
The first set of experiments is conducted in the server ma-
chine. Three core counters, ICache.Miss, ICache.Hit and
LLC.Miss are monitored concurrently in the data collection
process. The training dataset is collected with a sampling rate
of 1 ms from m = 3 core counters during the execution
of benign applications. The dataset has 10 million samples
(10,000 seconds) in total, collected from 67 randomly selected
benchmark tests, 100 websites rendering in Google Chrome,
Apache server/client benchmark, MySQL database and Office
applications as listed in Appendix, Table V. Note that the idle
time frames between the executions are excluded from dataset
to avoid the redundant information in the training phase.
Firstly, LSTM model is trained with the collected dataset
where the input size is 3× 10, 000, 000. The sliding window
size is selected as W = 100, which means the total number
of LSTM units equals to 100. The further details of window
size analysis is given in Section V-E. The training is stopped
after 10 epochs since the validation error does not improve
further. The validation error decreases to 0.0015. The training
time for 10,000,000 samples takes approximately 4 days.
After the LSTM model is trained, a new dataset for the
test phase is collected from counters by profiling 173 benign
benchmark tests, 100 random websites, MySQL, Apache,
Office applications and micro-architectural attacks. The length
of the test data for each application would change, since
our anomaly-based model has no assumption on the input
length. Hence, the number of samples obtained from each
application changes between 1000-20000. The number of
samples for websites is around 1000, since the rendering
process is extremely fast. However, some benchmarks have
a longer execution time, which requires to collect data for
a longer time. The remaining applications (Office, MySQL,
Apache) are profiled for around 5 seconds.
Each application is monitored 50 times, and then, the test
data is fed into the LSTM model to predict the counter
values at the next time steps. Moreover, in order to make
the test phase more realistic, the number of applications
running concurrently is increased up to 5. The applications
are chosen randomly from the test list in Appendix Table V,
and started at the same time. 100 measurements are collected
from concurrently running applications. In total, 25,000,000
samples are collected for the test phase.
The prediction is made for all three counters at each time
step (every 1 ms), and then, the mean squared error e(t+1)
is computed between the actual and predicted counter values.
e(t+1) in the prediction step is used to choose optimal decision
window D and τA to detect the anomalies in the system. If the
prediction error is higher than the threshold τA for D samples,
the application is classified as an anomaly. The threshold and
decision window are chosen as to equalize FNR and FPR. The
trend between τA for D is given in Figure 6. For the lower
τA values, the decision window is not applicable to detect the
anomalies, since the benign applications and attack executions
have higher error rates. Once the τA reaches 1.8×106, most of
the attack executions are detected in D = 50 samples. In other
words, the microarchitectural attacks are caught in 50 ms by
FortuneTeller. With the increasing τA values, the number of
true positives begins decreasing, which yields to low detection
rate.
The results show that P+P attack is the most difficult
attack to be detected by the LSTM model in the server. This
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Fig. 6. Threshold vs. Decision Window for benign applications (gray) and
attack executions (red) using LSTM model in server scenario
result is expected since P+P attack mostly focuses on specific
cache sets and the cache miss ratio is smaller than other
type of attacks. In addition, instruction cache is not heavily
used by P+P attack, which makes the detection more difficult
for FortuneTellerdue to the lack of specific pattern. On the
other hand, the highest TPR is obtained for Flush+Reload
and Rowhammer attacks with 100% and 0% FNR. As these
attacks increase the number of data cache misses and in-
struction hits through the extensive use of clflush instruction,
the fluctuation in the counter values is higher than the other
types of attacks and benign applications. The accuracy of the
predicting the next values decreases when the variance is high
in the counters, thus, the prediction error increases in parallel.
Since the higher prediction rate is a strong indicator of the
attack executions in the system, FortuneTeller detects them
with a high accuracy. Note that, Zombieload is also detectable
by the FortuneTeller, even though it was not included in
the performance counter selection phase. This shows that
FortuneTeller can detect the unseen microarchitectural attacks
with the current trained models.
The ROC curves in Figure 7 indicate that LSTM networks
have a better capability than GRU networks to detect the
anomalies. The counter values are predicted with a higher error
rate in GRU networks, which makes the anomaly detection
harder. Some benign applications are always detected as
anomaly by GRU, thus, the FPR is always high for different
threshold values. The AUC (Area Under the Curve) for LSTM
model is very close to perfect classifier with a value of 0.9840.
On the other hand, the AUC for GRU model is 0.9125, which
is significantly worse than LSTM model. There are several
reasons behind the poor performance of GRU networks. The
first reason is that GRU networks are not successful to learn
the patterns of Apache server applications since there is a high
fluctuation in the counter values. In addition, when the number
of concurrently running applications increases, the false alarms
increase drastically. On the other hand, LSTM networks are
good at predicting the combination of patterns in the system.
Therefore, the FPR is very small for LSTM model.
D. Laptop Environment
The experiments are repeated for the laptop environment to
evaluate the usage of FortuneTeller. LSTM and GRU models
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Fig. 7. ROC curve for LSTM and GRU models in server scenario
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attack executions (red) using LSTM model in laptop scenario
are trained with 10 million samples, which is collected from
benign applications. Since the laptops are mostly used for daily
works, the counter values are relatively smaller than the server
scenario. However, the applications stress the system more
than the server scenario since the number of cores is lower.
When we analyze the relation between D and τA, we
observe the same situation as in the server scenario. The
lower τA values are not sufficient to differ the anomalies from
benign executions. Therefore, we need to choose the optimal
τA value slightly higher than the server scenario with a value
of 3.8× 106. The corresponding D value is 60, which means
that the anomalies are detected in 60 ms. The decision window
is 10 ms bigger than server scenario however, the performance
of FortuneTeller is better in laptop scenario. In Figure 9, the
ROC curves of LSTM and GRU models are compared. The
AUC value of LSTM model is considerably higher than GRU
model with a value of 0.9865. However, the AUC value for
GRU is 0.8925. This shows that LSTM outperforms GRU
model to predict the counter values of benign applications.
This also concludes that FNR and FPR are lower for LSTM
models.
Among the attack executions, Rowhammer attack can be
detected with 100% success rate since the prediction error is
very high. The other attacks have similar prediction errors,
hence, FortuneTeller can detect the attacks with the same
success rate. Since the computational power of laptop devices
is low, the concurrent running applications have more noise
on the counter values. Therefore, the prediction of the counter
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TABLE II
THE FALSE ALARM RATE IN PERCENTAGE PER SECOND FOR
APPLICATIONS
Server (%) Laptop (%)
LSTM GRU LSTM GRU
Benchmarks 0.1400 0.1442 0.1202 0.4808
Websites 0.0550 0.0972 0.0278 0.6667
Videos 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4138
MySQL 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Apache 0.0000 0.8333 0.0000 0.4030
Office 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
2 Apps 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5000
3 Apps 0.0000 0.1667 0.0000 0.5715
4 Apps 0.0750 0.2000 0.0500 0.6667
5 Apps 0.1250 0.2333 0.1000 0.8333
values is more difficult for RNN algorithms. While LSTM
networks have small FPR for 4 and 5 applications running at
the same time, GRU networks are not efficient to classify them
as benign applications.
The overall results show that LSTM works better than GRU
networks for both laptop and server scenarios in Table II. The
first and second values represent the LSTM and GRU false
alarm rates per second in percentages, respectively. In the
server scenario, videos, MySQL and Office applications never
give false positives. Websites running in Google Chrome have
a small amount of false alarm. Therefore, the FPR and FNR
are around 0.12% per second for LSTM network in server
scenario overall. The main disadvantage of GRU networks is
the poor performance in the prediction when the number of
applications increases. The FPR and FNR are approximately
0.24%. This shows that the number of false alarms is twice
more for GRU based FortuneTeller.
In laptop scenario, LSTM performs better, which is sup-
ported by the false alarm rate. The number of false alarms
is lower than the server scenario for laptop devices with a
value of 0.09%. On the other hand, the GRU networks are
lack of ability to predict the counter values, thus, it is also
reflected in false alarm rates. For every application, GRU has
a higher false alarm rate than LSTM networks. Therefore, it
is concluded that FortuneTellershould be trained with LSTM
networks to have the better performance in both server and
laptop scenarios.
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E. Varying size of Sliding Window
We observed that the prediction results are affected by
the size of the window. Therefore, we analyze the effect
of sliding window size on anomaly detection with the data
collected from core counters with 1 ms sampling rate in the
server environment. 12 different window sizes are used to train
LSTM and GRU models. The window size starts from 25 and
increased by 25 at each step until reaching 300.
The changes in the validation error for both LSTM and GRU
networks are depicted in Figure 10. The overall GRU training
error is higher than LSTM network for each window size.
Both models reach the lowest error when the sliding window
size is 100. Even though LSTM and GRU are designed to
learn long sequences, it is recommended to choose the window
size between 50-150. Since the best error is obtained with a
window size of 100, all the models in the previous experiments
are trained with this parameter. It is also important to note
that the training time increases proportional to the size of the
window.
F. Time consumption for Testing
The dynamic detection of the anomalies also depends on
the time consumption of predicting the next counter values.
Therefore, the sampling rate should be chosen as close as
to the timing consumption of predicting the next value. In
our experiments, we observed that the prediction time is
proportional to the size of the model. Since GRU has less
number of cells in the architecture, the prediction of GRU is
faster. While LSTM outputs prediction values for 3 counters in
2 ms, the prediction time for GRU is 1.7 ms. It shows that GRU
is 15% faster than LSTM in the prediction phase. However,
due to the high FPR of GRU networks FortuneTeller is trained
with LSTM networks to detect anomalies in the real time
system.
G. Performance Overhead
The performance overhead of the proposed countermeasures
is one of the most important concerns, since it affects all the
applications running on the system. In this section, we evaluate
the performance overhead for both server and laptop devices
when core counters are used to collect data. The overhead
amount is obtained with sampling rates of 1 ms and 10µs. As
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it is expected the performance overhead increases in parallel
with the sampling rate. In the server environment the overhead
is around 7.7% when the sampling rate is chosen as 10µs.
The overhead of individual tests fluctuates between 1% and
33% for benign applications. The performance of system and
memory benchmarks is affected more than processor based
benchmarks. On the other hand, when the sampling rate is
decreased to 1ms, the performance overhead drops to 3.5%.
The individual overheads change between 0.3% and 18%,
which is more stable than the previous case.
In laptop scenario, the performance overhead is also calcu-
lated with the same benign benchmarks. The number of cores
is smaller than the server scenario. Therefore, the performance
monitoring unit only needs to read the counter values from 4
threads in parallel. On the other hand, since the system has
lower features compared to the server machine, the overhead
is increased when the sampling rate is increased .The overall
performance degradation is 24.88% for 10µs. The overhead
fluctuates heavily, which means that the applications suffer
from the frequent interruptions to read the counter values.
Once the sampling rate is decreased to 1 ms, the overhead
drops to 1.6%, which is applicable in real-time systems. This
overhead is also lower than the server scenario. Therefore, We
preferred 1 ms sampling rate in our experiments.
VI. COMPARISON OF FortuneTeller WITH PRIOR
DETECTION METHODS
There are several studies focused on microarchitectural
attack detection as given in Table I. While some works [7],
[10], [67] use unsupervised techniques, Mushtaq et al. [41]
benefits from supervised ML methods. All proposed meth-
ods claim that the false positive rate is very low in a real
world scenarios. However, all these detection techniques are
only applied for cryptographic implementations (AES, RSA,
ECDSA etc.) and specific cache attacks (F+R, F+F, P+P). The
performance of these techniques in real world scenarios (noisy
environment, multiple concurrent processes) against transient
execution attacks (Meltdown, Spectre, Zombieload etc.) and
Rowhammer is questionable. In order to evaluate 4 proposed
methods and FortuneTeller, we collected 6 million samples (4
million benign executions, 2 million attack executions) with
1ms sampling rate from 10 benign processes and 7 microar-
chitecture attacks by using system-wide counters. Note that
each benign and attack execution is monitored 100 times in
the server environment. The benign processes are chosen from
diverse set of applications such as Apache, MySQL, browser
and cryptographic implementations. The attacks cover cache-
based, transient execution and Rowhammer attacks given
in Table V. The detection algorithms from previous works are
rewritten in Matlab environment and tested with the collected
data.
CPD from Briongos et al. [7] The first approach is Change
Point Detection (CPD) which was implemented by Briongos
et al. [7] to detect the anomalies in the victim process. The
primary advantage of the method is to have the capability
of self-learning by observing the number of cache misses.
On the other hand, the assumption of having almost no LLC
miss is a strong assumption, which is not applicable in real-
world scenarios for system-wide profiling. Especially, when an
application runs for the first time in the system, the number of
cache misses increases drastically. This yields to high number
of false positives at the beginning of the applications. Even
though it is tried to eliminate the initial false positives by
increasing the initial value of cache misses under attack (µa),
we still observe several false positives at the beginning. It is
also difficult to monitor each PID in the system since there
are hundreds of processes running at the same time.
For the evaluation of CPD method, we use the initial value
of µa = 100 and β = 0.65. When CPD method is applied
to our dataset, we observe that the FPR is 3% and FNR is
10%. Therefore, the F-score is 0.9372. However, with the
increasing number of concurrent processes, the false positive
rate increases. This shows that CPD method is efficient for
low system load however, it gives more false positives with
increasing workload. The estimated detection time is around
300 ms for attack executions. The detection performance
for Rowhammer and P+P attacks is poor since the number
of cache misses is not high compared to benign processes.
Therefore, these two attack types increase the FNR.
DTW from Zhang et al. [67] The second detection method
was proposed by Zhang et al. [67], which benefits from
Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) to detect the cryptographic
implementations and then, the LLC hit and miss counters are
monitored to detect the attacks. In the first step, DTW is used
to compare the test data and the signature of cryptographic
implementations obtained from branch instructions. Secondly,
when the distance between test and target execution is very
small, the LLC hit and LLC miss counters are monitored. If
there is a sudden jump in these two counters, the anomaly flag
is set. Again, this approach requires the PID of the monitored
process.
In the evaluation of the method, we started with the applica-
tion detection. Since the number of target applications is small
in our dataset, DTW can detect them with 100% success rate in
a noiseless environment. However, when there is a concurrent
process running in the system, the DTW distance is always
high. The reason behind this failure is that branch instructions
are heavily affected by the other processes. Therefore, DTW
is not suitable for real-world scenarios. Another drawback is
that if the microarchitectural attack already started, the branch
instructions is also affected, which prevents to detect the target
application. Hence, the attack detection step never starts. When
the target process is detected, the anomaly detection step
begins. If another concurrent work starts running at the same
time, the cache miss and hit counters start increasing, which
increases the FPR extremely. Since there is only a simple
threshold approach to detect the attacks and the proposed
decision window (5 ms) is too small, the FPR raises. In these
circumstances, the approach achieves 10% FPR. The attack
detection is also not great since it is not possible to detect
F+F attack with cache miss and hit counters. Thus, the the
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FNR increases in parallel which yields to 20% FNR. Overall,
the detection technique has 0.8572 F-score.
PDF from Chiappetta et al. [10] In the third study, we
evaluate the performance of normal distribution and proba-
bility density function, which is proposed by Chiappetta et
al. [10]. The detection technique monitors five counters (total
instructions, CPU cycles, L2 hits, L3 miss and L3 hits) to
catch the anomalies in the cryptographic implementations.
This technique is used in unsupervised manner by only
learning the normal distribution of the attack execution (F+R)
with its mean and variance in the system. After the normal
distribution is calculated, the probability density function (pdf)
of both attack and benign executions is calculated for each
counter sample. Then, an optimal threshold () is chosen to
separate the benign and attack processes. To evaluate the
performance of the method, we collected a separate dataset
with the aforementioned five counters. The results indicated
that total instructions and L2 hits decrease the performance
of detecting anomalies. On the other hand, L3 hits and miss
counters overperform other counters. The main drawback of
this method is that there is no learning and the decisions are
made on only cache miss and variance values. Therefore, when
there is a benign application with high variance and mean, it is
more likely to be classified as an anomaly. Especially, Apache
server benchmark and videos running in browsers give high
FPR. It is also observed that the P+P, F+F and Rowhammer
attacks are not detected with a high accuracy, which give
0.2145 and 0.3732 for FPR and FNR, respectively. The F-
score of the detection technique is 0.7278.
OC-SVM from Mushtaq et al. [41] The last method to
compare is One Class Support Vector Machine (OC-SVM),
which is used by Mushtaq et al. [41] to detect the anomalies
on cryptographic implementations. The scope is limited F+F
and F+R attacks. The number of counters tested in [41] is
higher than three, which makes it impossible to monitor all
of them concurrently. Therefore, we chose three counters (L1
miss, L3 hit and L3 total cache access), which give the highest
F-score. Even though OC-SVM was used in a supervised
way in [41], we used it in unsupervised manner to maintain
the consistency in the comparison. In the training phase,
the model is trained with the 50% of the benign execution
data. Then, the attack and benign dataset are tested with the
trained model. The obtained confidence scores are used to
find the optimal decision boundary to separate the benign
and attack executions. The optimal decision boundary shows
that the FPR and FNR are 0.2750 and 0.2778, respectively.
The main problem is that OC-SVM is not sufficient to learn
the diverse benign applications, which increases the FPR
drastically. Moreover, Rowhammer and F+F attacks are not
detected, which is the reason of higher FNR. Therefore, the
F-score remains at 0.7240.
FortuneTeller Finally, we apply FortuneTeller to detect the
anomalies in the system. Since the diversity of the benign
executions is smaller in the comparison dataset, it is more
easier to learn the patterns. It is also important to note that
50 measurements from each benign application is enough to
reach the minimum prediction error. Once the LSTM model
is trained with the benign applications, the attack executions
and remaining benign application data are tested. The FPR and
FNR remains at 0.2% and 0.4%, respectively. The F-score is
0.997 for the FortuneTeller.
TABLE III
COMPARISON OF PREVIOUS METHODS
Technique F-score
Briongos et al. [7] CPD 0.9372
Zhang et al. [67] DTW 0.8572
Chiappetta et al. [10] Normal Dist. 0.7278
Mushtaq et al. [41] OC-SVM 0.7240
Our work LSTM/GRU 0.9970
The comparison results are summarized in Table III. The
lack of appropriate learning is significant in the wild. It is also
obvious that even simple learning algorithm such as CPD can
help to overperform other detection techniques. We also show
that the detection accuracy increases by learning the sequential
patterns of benign applications with the system-wide profiling.
Therefore, it is significantly important to extract the fine-
grained information from the hardware counters to achieve
the low FPR and FNR. The common deficiencies of previous
works are listed below:
• The detection methods focus on only cryptographic im-
plementations, and the latest attacks such as Rowhammer,
Spectre, Meltdown and Zombieload are not covered.
• There is no advanced learning technique applied in the
detection methods. They mostly rely on the sudden
changes in the counters, which increases the FPR heavily.
• The detection methods are either tested under no noise
environment or the workload is not realistic. In addition,
the FPR is not tested with a diverse set of applications.
VII. DISCUSSION
Bypassing FortuneTeller One of the questions about dynamic
detection methods is that how an educated adversary can
bypass the detection model? The common way is to put some
delays between the attack steps to avoid increasing the counter
values. For this purpose, we inserted different amounts of idle
time frames between attack steps in Flush+Flush, Prime+Probe
and Flush+Reload. We observed that the prediction errors
in GRU and LSTM networks increases in parallel with the
amount of sleep due to the high fluctuation. This shows that
introducing delays between attack steps is not an efficient
way to circumvent FortuneTeller. The reason behind this is
the fluctuation in the time series data is not predicted well
in the prediction phase. Therefore, we concluded that putting
different amount of sleep between the attack steps is not
enough to fool FortuneTeller. On the other hand, crafting
adversarial examples is an efficient way to bypass Deep
Learning based detection methods. For instance, Rosenberg
et al [45] shows that LSTM/GRU based malware detection
techniques can be bypassed by carefully inserting additional
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API calls in between. Therefore, crafting adversarial code
snippets to change the performance counters in the attack code
may fool FortuneTeller. The main difficulty in this approach
is that it is not possible to decrease the counter values by
executing more instructions between attack steps. Therefore,
applying adversarial examples on hardware counter values is
not trivial.
Training Algorithm FortuneTeller investigates both available
long-term dependency learning techniques. We observed that
GRU performs worse than LSTM networks to predict the
counter values in the next time steps. This is because of
the lack of internal memory state, which keeps the relevant
information from previous cells. This result is also supported
with the high FPR and FNR of GRU networks. Since the
prediction error increases for attack executions more than be-
nign applications, the detection accuracy decreases. Therefore,
we recommend to train LSTM networks for microarchitectural
attack detection techniques.
Dynamic Detection The current implementation requires to
have a GPU to train FortuneTeller, as GPU based training 40
times faster than CPU based training. The training is mostly
done in an offline phase and it does not affect the dynamic
detection. On the other hand, dynamic detection heavily de-
pends on the matrix multiplication, since the trained model
is loaded as a matrix in the system and the same matrix is
multiplied with the current counter values. Hence, the required
time to predict the next counter values is lower. In addition,
we observed that the performance overhead is negligible for
the matrix multiplication in the CPU systems. Therefore,
FortuneTeller can be implemented in server/cloud/laptop en-
vironments, even though there is no GPU integrated in the
system.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This study presented FortuneTeller, which exploits the
power of neural networks to overcome the limitations of
the prior works, and further proposes a novel generic model
to classify microarchitectural events. FortuneTeller is able
to dynamically detect microarchitectural anomalies in the
system through learning benign workload. In our study, we
adopted two state-of-the-art RNN models: GRU and LSTM.
We concluded that LSTM is more preferable compared to
GRU for our use case. Further, the number of measurements
and the sliding window size have a significant effect on the
validation error in training phase, which makes it crucial to
choose the optimal values to have better prediction results. For-
tuneTeller is applicable to both server and laptop environments
with a high accuracy. In order to evaluate the performance
of FortuneTeller, we used both benchmarks and real-world
applications and achieved 0.12% and 0.09% FPRs for server
and laptop environments, respectively. FortuneTeller is also
tested against previous works in the realistic scenarios and it
is concluded that, FortuneTelleroverperforms other detection
meahcnisms in the wild. While the performance overhead in
laptop environment is less than server, FortuneTeller is still
applicable in the real world systems with minimal overhead.
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IX. APPENDIX
A. Tables for Performance Counters and Benchmarks
TABLE IV
COUNTER SELECTION FOR CORE COUNTERS
Counter F-score
Dtlb Load Misses.Miss Causes A Walk 0.5657
Dtlb Load Misses.Walk Completed 4K 0.5226
Dtlb Load Misses.Walk Completed 0.5327
Dtlb Load Misses.Walk STLB Hit 4K 0.3627
UOPS Issued Any 0.3663
ICACHE.Hit 0.8137
ICACHE.Miss 0.7979
L1D Pend Miss.Pending 0.6818
L1D Pend Miss.Request FB Full 0.6698
L1D.Replacement 0.7523
L2 Rqsts Lat Cache.Miss 0.6244
LLC Miss 0.8416
LLC Reference 0.6167
IDQ.Mite UOPS 0.3383
BR Inst Exec.Nontaken Cond. 0.2703
BR Inst Exec.Taken Cond. 0.3390
BR Inst Exec.Taken Direct Jmp 0.3455
BR Inst Exec.Taken Indirect Jmp Non Call Ret 0.3137
BR Inst Exec.Taken Indirect Near Return 0.2944
BR Inst Exec.Taken Direct Near Call 0.3618
BR Inst Exec.Taken Indirect Near Call 0.3592
BR Inst Exec.All Cond. 0.2634
BR Inst Exec.All Direct Jmp 0.3238
BR Misp Exec.Nontaken Cond. 0.3648
BR Misp Exec.Taken Cond. 0.4510
BR Misp Exec.Taken Indirect Jmp Non Call Ret 0.4455
BR Misp Exec.Taken Ret Near 0.3491
BR Misp Exec.Taken Indirect Near Call 0.3553
BR Misp Exec.All Branches 0.2700
BR Inst Retired.Cond. 0.4623
BR Inst Retired.Not Taken 0.4412
BR Inst Retired.Far Branch 0.4608
BR Misp Retired.All Branch 0.4615
BR Misp Retired.Cond. 0.3786
BR Misp Retired.All Branches Pebs 0.2111
BR Misp Retired.Near Taken 0.2871
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TABLE V
BENCHMARK TESTS USED IN THE EXPERIMENTS
Processor Tests System Tests Disk Tests Memory Tests Real-World Attacks
1) Aobench 41) Minion 1 81) Graphics 1 120) Apache 153) Aio-stress 165) Mbw 174) Websites 1) Flush+Flush
2) Botan 1 42) Minion 2 82) Graphics 2 121) Battery 154) Blogbench 1 166) Ram 1 175) Videos 2) Flush+Reload
3) Botan 2 43) Minion 3 83) Graphics 3 122) Compress 155) Blogbench 2 167) Ram 2 176) MySQL 3) Prime+Probe
4) Botan 3 44) Perl 1 84) Graphics 4 123) Git 156) Compile 168) Ram 3 177) Apache 4) Meltdown
5) Botan 4 45) Perl 2 85) Graphics 5 124) Hint 157) Dbench 169) Ram 4 178) Office 5) Spectre
6) Botan 5 46) Radiance 1 86) Graphics 6 125) Nginx 158) Fio 1 170) Ram 5 6) Rowhammer
7) Bullet 1 47) Radiance 2 87) Graphics 7 126) Optcarrot 159) Fio 2 171) Stream 7) Zombieload
8) Bullet 2 48) Scimark 1 88) Hpcg 127) Php 1 160) Iozone 172) T-test
9) Bullet 3 49) Scimark 2 89) Luajit 1 128) Php 2 161) Postmark 173) Tinymem
10) Bullet 4 50) Scimark 3 90) Luajit 2 129) Pybench 162) Sqlite
11) Bullet 5 51) Scimark 4 91) Luajit 3 130) Schbench 163) Tiobench
12) Bullet 6 52) Scimark 5 92) Luajit 4 131) Stress-ng 1 164) Unpack
13) Bullet 7 53) Scimark 6 93) Luajit 5 132) Stress-ng 2
14) Cache 1 54) Swet 94) Luajit 6 133) Stress-ng 3
15) Cache 2 55) Hackbench 95) Mencoder 134) Stress-ng 4
16) Cache 3 56) M-queens 96) Multichase 1 135) Stress-ng 5
17) Gzip 57) Mrbayes 97) Multichase 2 136) Stress-ng 6
18) Dcraw 58) Npb 1 98) Multichase 3 137) Stress-ng 7
19) Encode 59) Npb 2 99) Multichase 4 138) Stress-ng 8
20) Ffmpeg 60) Npb 3 100) Multichase 5 139) Stress-ng 9
21) Fhourstones 61) Npb 4 101) Polybench-c 140) Stress-ng 10
22) Glibc 1 62) Npb 5 102) Sample 141) Stress-ng 11
23) Glibc 2 63) Npb 6 103) Sudokut 142) Stress-ng 12
24) Glibc 3 64) Npb 7 104) C-ray 143) Stress-ng 13
25) Glibc 4 65) Povray 105) Cloverleaf 144) Stress-ng 14
26) Glibc 5 66) Smallpt 106) Dacapo 1 145) Stress-ng 15
27) Glibc 6 67) Tachyon 107) Dacapo 2 146) Stress-ng 16
28) Glibc 7 68) Bork 108) Dacapo 3 147) Sunflow
29) Glibc 8 69) Build Apache 109) Dacapo 4 148) Sysbench 1
30) Gnupg 70) Byte 1 110) Dacapobench 5 149) Sysbench 2
31) Java 1 71) Byte 2 111) John 1 150) Tensorflow
32) Java 2 72) Byte 3 112) John 2 151) Tjbench
33) Java 3 73) Byte 4 113) John 3 152) Xsbench
34) Java 4 74) Clomp 114) Mafft
35) Java 5 75) Crafty 115) N-queens
36) Java 6 76) Dolfyn 116) Openssl
37) Lzbenc 1 77) Espeak 117) Primesieve
38) Lzbench 2 78) Fftw 118) Stockfish
39) Lzbench 3 79) Gcrypt 119) Ttsiod
40) Lzbench 4 80) Gmpbench
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